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TEEE FEDERAL BANKING AGENCIES' GUIDANCE
ON SUBPRIME LENDING: REGULATION WITH A
DIVIDED AIND
JOSEPH A. SMITH, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Subprime lending has been a videly-followed segment of
the financial services industry for a number of years. After a
period in the mid-1990s, when the gains to shareholders of
subprime lending firms were significant and the pay to some
executives of such firms stratospheric, this segment of the financial
services marketplace has experienced a substantial correction,
including stunning reversals of fortune for a number of subprime
lenders.1 Over the same period of time, allegations of predatory
tactics by subprime lenders have become a significant issue of
public policy debate, regulatory action and litigation.
Counsel, Thacher Proffitt & Wood, Washington, D.C.; A.B., 1971, Davidson
College; J.D.. 1974, University of Virginia. The author v:ould like to expres3 his
thanks to Professor Lissa Broome, Cynthia Collins Mabel, and Ashley D. Fluhme for
their helpful comments and assistance in the completion of this article. Errors and
omissions contained in this article are, of course, the responsibility of the author
alone.
1. Alex Berenson, A Boom Built Upon Sand, Gone Bust. N.Y. TnMES, Nov. 25,
2001, at B1 (revie-wing and analyzing the subprime lending activities of Conscco, an
Indiana based insurance and financial services company). Conceco entered the
subprime market through the acquisition of Green Tree Financial, a leader in the
financing of manufactured housing. Id. During much of the lqqLk Green Tree and
then Conseco financed approximately 41% of the manufactured housing purch-id
in the United States. Id. Financing its activities through securitization, Greentree's
profits jumped 600% from 1991 to 1997, and its stock price increased thirty-fold. Id.
at B7. One CEO of Greentree was paid $200 million from lq91 to 1993 ,ith a $30
million severance package on retirement, the CEO of Consect v,as paid $530 million
from 1993 to 2000 and received a $72 million severance package. ItL After this
period of astonishing performance, massive defaults occurrcd followed by write-offs
of over $1.3 billion from 1999 through 2(01 and a decline in stock price of
approximately 920%. Id.
2. U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, CURBING PREDAioRY
HosiE MIORTGAGE LENDING, REPORT OF THE NATIUN XL TASKFORCE ON
PREDATORY LENDING (June 20, 2000), available at http:1.v,;,,w.huduser.org1
publicationshsgfinfcurbing.html (last visited on Feb. 14, 2002); Chris De Reza,
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Banking organizations3 have been significant participants in
the subprime market. The adverse consequences of this activity
have resulted in significant losses to a number of such
organizations and have contributed to the failure of others. At
the same time, Citigroup increased its participation in the
subprime market through the acquisition of Associates First
Capital Corp., a market leader in subprime lending.
5
Because of the increase in subprime lending activities of
banking organizations, the federal agencies that regulate them (the
"Agencies") 6 have individually and collectively issued guidance on
this activity over the last several years, including: (i) a 1997 release
(the "1997 Release") by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation ("FDIC");7 (ii) in 1999, Interagency Guidelines on
Subprime Lending (the "1999 Guidelines");' (iii) also in 1999,
Citigroup Settles in North Carolina, Real Estate Finance Today, (Sept. 17, 2001)
(published on the MORTGAGE BROKERS ASS'N OF AM. website), at
http://www.mbaa.org/reft/stories/0135citi.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2002); Erick
Bergquist, Fines, Tight Scrutiny in Household Settlement, AM. BANKER, Jan. 8, 2002;
Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Charges One of the Nations Largest
Subprime Lenders with Abusive Lending Practice (Mar. 6, 2001), at
http:lwww.ftc.gov/opa/200l/03/associates.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2002).
3. As used in this article, the term "banking organizations" includes banks, thrift
institutions, and their holding companies.
4. Both First Union (prior to its merger with Wachovia) and Bank of America
have gotten out of the subprime lending business in the recent past. In June 2000,
First Union closed its Money Store consumer finance subsidiary and liquidated a
number of substandard loans, taking an aggregate charge of $2.8 billion. Marc
Hochstein, First Union Says Its Appetite is Curbed, AM. BANKER, June 27, 2000, at 1.
In August 2001, Bank of America announced its withdrawal from subprime lending
and auto leasing and recorded a $1.25 billion charge. Mollenkamp, Beckett and
Sapsford, Bank of America Quits 'Subprime' Loans, Latest Casualty of Worsening
Economy, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 2001, at Al. The failure of Superior Bank, FSB and
the costs to the deposit insurance funds of failed subprime lenders are discussed infra
at notes 79-82.
5. Patrick McGeehan, Citigroup to Buy Associates for $31 Billion, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 7, 2000, at Cl. The transaction was not without controversy. See Erick
Bergquist, Judging Citi a Year Later, AM. BANKER, Sept. 10, 2001, at 1 (discussing
Citi's apparent progress to reform Associates in an effort to become a "model
subprime lending citizen," and critics dissatisfaction with Citi's progress).
6. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and Office of Thrift
Supervision.
7. Risks associated with subprime lending, 6 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) T 63-
782, at 73,274-75 (May 2, 1997) [hereinafter 1997 Release].
8. Interagency guidelines on subprime lending, 6 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) T1
63-786, at 73,287-92 (Mar. 5, 1999) [hereinafter 1999 Guidelines].
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supplemental guidance from the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency ("OCC") on subprime lending (the -1999 OCC
Guidance"); 9 and (iv) expanded interagency guidance in 2001 (the
"2001 Guidance"). This guidance reflects a divided mind by the
Agencies regarding subprime lending. On one hand, the Agencies
cautiously acknowledge the profit potential of subprime lending
and approve the extension of credit to borrowers who, absent
subprime lending, might otherwise have been denied credit. On
the other, they express concern regarding the risk of such activity
for lenders. The Agencies have also issued a final rule regarding
the regulatory capital treatment of credit enhancements in
securitization transactions, which enhancements are particularly
important to securitization of subprime loans." In addition, the
Agencies and a number of state and local governments have taken
a variety of actions intended to prohibit or discourage alleged
predatory practices in consumer lending."
This Article will review the actions of the Agencies with
regard to subprime lending and assess their impact on such activity
by banking organizations. First, it will be argued that the
Agencies' actions have increased the costs of subprime lending to
banking organizations and reduced the means through which such
organizations can recover these additional costs. Next, the Article
will argue that the probable effect of these actions for subprime
borrowers generally will be a reduction in available credit,
increased borrowing costs, or both. Finally, the Article will
explore the argument that absent substantial commitments of
capital by public and non-profit agencies and organizations, the
likely outcome of the increased regulatory focus for low-
income/low-wealth persons will be reduced credit availability.
9. Subprime lending supplemental guidance and interim examination guidance, 6
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 63-7S6B. at 72,293-12 (Apr. 5, 1499) [hereinafter 1999
OCC Guidance].
10. Expanded Guidance for Subprime Lending Programs, 6 Fed. Banking L. Rep
(CCH) S 63-792, at 73,299-30 to 38 (Jan. 31, 2001) [hereinafter 2001 Guidance]. The
2001 Guidance was jointly issued by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, and Office of Thrift Superision. Id.
11. See infra notes 63-78 and accompanying text.
12. See ifra notes 90-97.and accompanying text.
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II. SUBPRIME LENDING AND ITS BENEFITS
The Agencies' guidance on subprime lending begins, as it
should, with a definition of what that term means. The 1997
Release defines subprime lending to be:
extending consumer credit to individuals with
incomplete or somewhat tarnished credit records
who often are unable to obtain traditional
financing.... Although credit scoring models vary
within the financial services industry, and results
provided by common models are inconsistently
applied, these consumers generally score below
thresholds established for traditional bank credit.
1 3
Each of the releases from the Agencies that follows redefines or
augments this definition. 4 The 1999 OCC Guidance contains an
important insight by it dividing subprime borrowers into two broad
categories:
those attempting to repair their credit history
because of previous credit problems (usually one or
13. 1997 Release, 6 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 63-782, at 73,274.
14. For example, the 2001 Guidance, which lists a number of characteristics of
subprime borrowers, such as:
Two or more 30-day delinquencies in the last 12
months, or one or more 60-day delinquencies in
the last 24 months;
Judgment, foreclosure, repossession, or charge-
off in the prior 24 months;
Bankruptcy in the last 5 years;
Relatively high default probability as evidenced
by, for example, a credit bureau risk score
(FICO) of 660 or below (depending on
product/collateral), or other bureau or
proprietary scores with an equivalent default
probability likelihood; and/or
Debt service-to-income ratio or 50% or greater,
or otherwise limited ability to cover family living
expenses after deducting total monthly debt-
service requirements from monthly income.
2001 Guidance, 6 Fed. Banking L. Rep (CCH) 63-792, at 73,299-33.
[Vol. 6
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more major derogatory items such as 90 days or
more past due, charge-offs or bankruptcies); and
those attempting to establish or expand their credit
history (because, for example, of "thin" files or little
or no traditionally reported credit activity)."
Subprime borrowers are often unable to obtain credit from the
"conventional" banking system because of a credit history with
blemishes or no credit history at all."
These definitions are interesting for what they do not say.
They do not say that subprime lending is immoral, unfair or
predatory. On the contrary, extending credit to all segments of the
community, including borrowers with poor credit history or
insufficient income and wealth to meet conventional bank
underwriting standards, is a social goal that federal policy toward
banking organizations seeks to achieve. The Community
Reinvestment Act ("CRA")"7 is expressly intended to encourage,
if not require, such activity by banking organizations. Most or all
predatory lending may be subprime lending, but not all subprime
lending is predatory.
The definitions also do not say that subprime lending is
lending only to low-income/low-wealth borrowers. In a recent
interview, the chief executive officer of Household International, a
leading firm in the consumer finance industry, referred to his
firm's core business as: "the basic consumer finance business, in
which our clientele, the $45,000-a-year household, is always in
recession and needs our service of debt consolidation and loans for
unexpected expenses like braces and car-repair bills."' 3 The
subprime category includes borrowers who have income sufficient
to borrow from banks but who have damaged credit or who don't
want to deal with banks."9 A substantial portion of lending to low
15. 1999 OCC Guidance, 6 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 63-786B, at 73,294.
16. Id.
17. 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (2000).
18. Jonathan R. Laing, Does It Add Up?: A look at Household's accounting,
BARRON'S, Dec. 3,2001, at 21 (quoting William Aldinger).
19. For a discussion of the phenomenon of the "unbanked" see Joseph A. Smith,
Jr., Savings for the Poor. The Hidden Benefits of Elcctronic Banking: A Rcview' and
Response, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 1 (2001) and Michael A. Stegman, Banking the
Unbanked. Untapped Market Opportunities for North Carolina's Financial
Institutions, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 23 (2001).
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income borrowers is subprime; however, not all subprime lending
is to low-income low-wealth borrowers. This having been said, it is
also probable that low-income/low-wealth borrowers will fall into
the subprime category for one of the two reasons noted in the
definitions quoted above: bad credit history or no credit history.
Subprime lending is not treated by the Agencies as a
disfavored activity. The Agencies' cover letter to the 2001
Guidance, for example, states that: "[t]he Agencies continue to
believe that responsible subprime lending can expand credit access
for consumers and offer attractive returns provided that
institutions recognize and manage the unique risks associated with
this activity., 21 Subprime lending can be good business for banking
organizations both in terms of their social responsibilities and their
obligations to generate an optimum return. The reservations that
the Agencies have about subprime lending relate to the risks it
involves and the impact of such risks on institutional safety and
soundness.
III. THE RISK MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS OF
SUBPRIME LENDING
All lending activity involves risks. The guidance from the
Agencies on subprime lending focuses on the enhanced risk of that
activity and the willingness and ability of banking organizations to
manage that risk. For example, in the 1997 Release, the FDIC
points out that:
As with any activity, banks should identify and
understand the associated risks, design and
implement effective corresponding controls, and
establish prudent limits before engaging in the
subprime-related lending or investing .... Because
of the relatively high default and loss rates
associated with subprime credits, this lending
activity warrants particular caution and
management attention.21
20. 2001 Guidance, 6 Fed. Banking L. Rep (CCH) 63-792, at 73,299-30.
21. 1997 Release, 6 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 63-782, at 73,274-75.
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The 1997 Release then goes on to define the risk management
issues that bank subprime lenders must address prior to engaging
in the activity, including management expertise, operating
controls, loan policies and procedures, due diligence, and
appropriate assumptions regarding servicing costs and prospective
losses.22
The 1999 Guidelines expand on the risk management issues
outlined in the 1997 Release. In their letters to the chief executive
officers of banking organizations regarding the 1999 Guidelines,
the Agencies point out that:
Subprime lending is a high-risk activity. A number
of institutions have suffered losses attributable to ill-
advised or poorly structured subprime lending
programs. In particular, many institutions entering
the subprime lending business have discovered that
they grossly underestimated the default rates and
collection costs associated with these loans.
Furthermore, several experienced non-bank
subprime specialists have suffered material losses in
recent months despite their considerable expertise
in this field ....
Institutions should recognize the additional risks
inherent in this activity and determine if these risks
are acceptable and controllable given the
institution's staff, financial position, size and level of
capital support. In light of the higher risks
associated with this type of lending, the agencies
may impose higher minimum capital requirements
on institutions engaging in subprime lending. If the
risks associated with this activity are not properly
controlled or the bank's capital level is inadequate
given the magnitude of risk assumed, the
institution's subprime lending program may be
considered unsafe and unsound.2'
22. Id.
23. 1999 Guidelines. 6 Fed. Bankdng L. Rep. (CCH) 63-78, at 73,,-7- S).
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The 1999 Guidelines also discuss the factors that the Agencies will
look for in examinations to determine whether the institution is
appropriately managing the risks of subprime lending. These
factors include capitalization (discussed later in this article) and
credit risk management, techniques to deal with the enhanced risk
of the activity, including planning and strategy, staff expertise,
lending policy, purchase evaluation, loan administration
procedures, loan review and monitoring, and reevaluation.24 The
1999 OCC Guidance discusses many of the same topics in
additional detail.
With increasing levels of specificity, the risk management
guidance from the Agencies with regard to subprime lending
outlines the steps managements should take to ensure that the
risks of the activity are properly managed. As noted at the outset
of this section, an assessment of the relevant risks and the taking of
such steps to deal with them is a necessary predicate for all
lending activities. Because of the enhanced risks of subprime
lending, the administrative measures necessary to deal with the
credit risks associated with such activity must also be enhanced. In
addition, as discussed below, the Agencies' guidance requires that
the regulatory capital allocated to subprime lending also be
enhanced to reflect the additional risk that it entails.
IV. REGULATORY CAPITAL COST OF SUBPRIME LENDING
Banking organizations are required to maintain regulatory
capital sufficient to support their activities.26 In general, to be
24. Id. at 73,289-92 (including instructions to examiners regarding the assessment
of the role of subprime lending in the banking organization's business, the
institution's capacity to handle the risk of such activity, and the steps taken to deal
with such risk).
25. See 1999 OCC Guidance, 6 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) $ 63-786B, at
72,293-12 (supplemental lending and examination guidance to lenders participating in
the subprime market).
26. 12 U.S.C. § 3907 (2000); Minimum Capital Ratios: Issuance of Directives, 12
C.F.R. pt. 3 (2001). The regulatory provisions just cited have been issued by the
OCC and apply to national banks. Each of the Agencies has a separate set of
regulatory capital regulations for banking organizations under its supervision. With
exceptions that, where relevant, will be noted in this article, these regulations are
substantially similar. In order to simplify references to applicable law and
regulations, this article will cite as authority regulations issued by OCC and where
appropriate the statutory authority for such regulations.
[Vol. 6
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adequately capitalized, a banking organization must maintain
regulatory capital equal to at least eight percent of the risk-
adjusted value of its assets, of which at least four percent must be
Tier 1 capital.z7 In addition, the banking organization must
maintain Tier I capital equal to at least four percent of its adjusted
total assets. 2S Failure to maintain the capital levels mentioned
above can result in the imposition of a capital directive or
application of "prompt corrective action" by the relevant Agency,
either of which actions can have a material and adverse effect on
an institution's business and prospects. :  Conversely, maintenance
of "well capitalized" status under the regulatory capital rules ' may
result in advantages to a banking organization."
The capital cost of a banking organization's loan portfolio,
whether prime or subprime, depends on (i) the risk-weight
assigned to the loans in the portfolio and (ii) the capitalization
status the banking organization wishes to maintain. The risk
weights of assets vary. In general, they are divided among: (A)
zero risk weight assets, which category includes cash and
Treasuries; (B) twenty percent risk weight assets, which include
agency securities and obligations of OECD banks; (C) fifty
percent risk weight assets, which include loans in respect of one to
four family homes that meet the criteria set forth in the
regulations; and (D) one hundred percent risk weight assets, which
27. Capital and Surplus, 12 C.F.R. § 3.100, pt. 3, app. A, § 4 (2001). Tier I capital
is comprised of common stockholders' equity, noncumulatihe pwrptual prcfk:rrcd
stock and related surplus, and minority interests in the equity accounts of con, olidatc
subsidiaries. Id § 2(a). Tier 2 capital, which may account for up to 50°' of
regulatory capital, comprises allowance for loan and lease loses I(subject to c,.rtain
limits), cumulative perpetual preferred stock and other comparable securities. and
hybrid capital instruments. Id. § 2(b). Adjusted total assets are total assets as shovn
on a banking organization's regulatory financial statements minus certain intangible
assets and deferred tax and deferred tax assets. ML § 3.2 (a).
28. Minimum Capital Ratios, 12 C.F.R. §§ 3.6 (b)-(e) (Note, however, in the case
of a highly-rated institution, the required minimum capital may be three perc.cnt). Id.
§ 3.6(b).
29. See generally Issuance of a Directive, 12 C.F.R, § 3.15 (20011; Prompt
Corrective Action, 12 C.F.R §§ 6.1 to 6.6, 6.20 to 6.25 (20J1 ); see also 12 C.F.R. §
3.100 pt. 6. (2001).
30. Well-capitalized status requires: (i) capital equal to at least 10% of the risk-
weighted value of assets, of which at least 6% must be Tier I capital; and (ii) Tier I
capital equal to at least 5% of adjusted total assets. 12 C.F.R. § 6.4 (b)(1) (20011.
31. See Accelerated Approval for Establishment of an Operating Sub-idiary,
Operating Subsidiaries, 12 C.F.R. § 5.34 (e)(5 )1B )(iv) (201; sec also 12 C.F.R. §
5.39(g) (2001) (stating requirements for the establishment of a financial subsidiary).
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include all other asset categories, including commercial and
consumer loans.32 For example, an institution seeking to maintain
an adequately capitalized status would, in respect of $100 million
of 100% risk-weighted assets have the following capital costs: (i) a
risk-based capital cost of $8 million (of which at least $4 million
would have to be Tier 1 capital)33 and (ii) a leverage capital cost of
$ 4 million.34
The regulatory capital provisions just referred to, issued in
accordance with the 1988 Basel Capital Accords35 have been
criticized for being insufficiently "risk sensitive."36 This is
particularly the case with the one hundred percent risk weighting,
which applies to loans to both major corporations and the corner
32. Risk Categories/Weights for On-Balance Sheet Assets and Off-Balance Sheet
Items, 12 C.F.R. § 3.100, app. A, § 3 (2001). The assignment of risk weights to assets
is an area in which the OTS varies from the other Agencies. See generally Risk-
Based Capital Credit Risk-Weight Categories, 12 C.F.R. § 567.6 (2001). The OTS
regulations on this topic assign a 20% risk weighting to "[h]igh quality mortgage-
related securities, except for collateralized mortgage obligation classes," and a 50%
risk weighting to "[n]on-high quality mortgage-related securities" that are performing
loans and otherwise qualify. 12 C.F.R. § 567.6(a)(1)(ii)(H), (a)(1)(iii)(C) (2001).
Such assets would receive 50% or 100% risk weightings under the other Agencies'
risk weighting schemes, depending on their particular terms.
33. The product of the principal amount of the loans ($100 million) multiplied by
the risk weight (100%) and by the required capital adequacy rate (8%).
34. The principal amount of the loans ($100 million) multiplied by the required
capital adequacy rate (4%). See LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY MARKHAM,
REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL SERVICE ACTIVITIES 518-520 (2001) (discussing
risk based capital). Additionally, certain capitalization levels are required to
maintain financial holding company status.
35. THE BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL
CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARD (Consultative
Paper, July 1988), available at http://www.bis.org/publlbcbs04a.htm (last visited Feb.
23, 2002) [hereinafter The 1988 Accords]; THE BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, A NEW CAPITAL ADEQUACY FRAMEWORK (Consultative Paper, June
1999), available at http://www.bis.orglpubl/bcbs50.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2002). All
Basel Committee papers referred to in this document can be obtained from the BIS
webste at http://www.bis.org/publ/index.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2002).
36. THE BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, THE NEW BASEL
CAPITAL ACCORD (Consultative Paper, Jan. 2001) (summarizing a new regulatory
capital regime to replace the 1988 Accords in order to "provide approaches that are
both more comprehensive and more sensitive to risks than the 1988 Accord ....
Capital requirements that are more in line with the underlying risks will allow banks
to manage their businesses more efficiently"), available at http://www.bis.org/
publ/bcbsca.htm (last modified Feb. 12, 2001); see also http://bis.org/publ/bcbsca.htm
(supporting documents to the Jan. 2001 Proposal) (last visited Feb. 23, 2002); see
infra note 89 for a discussion of synthetic securitizations.
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gas station. As more fully discussed below, the 1999 Guidelines
and the 2001 Guidance impose additional capital requirements
with regard to subprime loans that increase, sometimes
substantially, the capital cost of originating and holding such loans.
It is interesting to note that these requirements are based on the
enhanced risk of subprime loans, and are, accordingly, "risk
sensitive" in a way the Basel Committee should approve.
The 1999 Guidelines include capitalization among the
factors that are to be assessed in determining whether an
institution is adequately managing the risks of subprime lending."
The federal banking agencies believe that subprime
lending activities can present a greater than normal
risk for financial institutions and the deposit
insurance funds; therefore, the level of capital
institutions need to support this kind of activity
should be commensurate with the additional risks
incurred. The amount of additional capital
necessary will vary according to the volume and
type of subprime activities pursued and the
adequacy of the institution's risk management
program. Institutions should determine how much
additional capital they need to offset the additional
risk taken in their subprime lending activities and
document the methodology used to determine this
amount.- '
With the exception of a brief discussion of the determination of
allowance for loan and lease losses (ALLL), which is a component
of Tier 2 (supplementary) regulatory capital, the 1999 Guidelines
do not explicitly deal with the levels of regulatory capital required
to conduct subprime activities. They make clear, however, that
enhanced capital is required and place the responsibility for
determining the additional amount, in the first instance, on
banking organizations.
The 2001 Guidance deals with the issue of regulatory
capital by establishing levels of subprime lending at which
enhanced regulatory capital is necessary and a range of required
37. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
38. 1999 Guidelines, 6 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) I 63-7N6, at 73,2$9.
2002]
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enhanced capital when the threshold is crossed. The introductory
statement to the 2001 Guidance points out that it:
applies specifically to those institutions having
subprime lending programs with an aggregate credit
exposure greater than or equal to 25% of [T]ier 1
capital. Aggregate exposure includes principal
outstanding and committed, accrued and unpaid
interest, and any retained residual assets. The
Agencies may also apply these guidelines to certain
smaller subprime portfolios, such as those
experiencing rapid growth or adverse performance
trends, those administered by inexperienced
management, and those with inadequate or weak
controls.39
Although the application of the 2001 Guidance is generally limited
to "programs," which term is defined to mean the acquisition of
subprime assets on a "regular or targeted basis,"4 the scope is
broader than it seems on first impression. In the first place, it
should be noted that under the regulatory capital requirements
discussed above, an institution must maintain Tier 1 capital of at
least three percent (and probably four percent) of adjusted total
assets if it is to be adequately capitalized and five percent or more
if it is "well capitalized." Assuming an institution maintains a
leverage ratio of between four and eight percent of average assets,
the 2001 Guidance's threshold may be exceeded if subprime loans
comprise between one and two percent of total assets. Further, as
noted above, the enhanced capital requirement may apply in other
circumstances.
The 2001 Guidance follows prior guidance by discussing the
credit risk management techniques necessary for subprime lending
programs. It goes beyond prior guidance by including specific
requirements regarding maintenance of (i) an appropriate ALLL
with respect to subprime loans and (ii) regulatory capital reflecting
the risks of such loans. Consistent with the generally applicable
requirement that ALLL reflect a provision in the banking
organization's financial statements for foreseeable losses from the




subprime portfolio, the 2001 Guidance requires that the allowance
"should be sufficient to absorb at least all estimated credit losses
on outstanding balances over the current operating cycle, typically
12 months."'" The 2001 Guidance then discusses the maintenance
of appropriate levels of regulatory capital:
Examiners will evaluate the capital adequacy of
subprime lenders on a case-by-case basis,
considering, among other factors, the institution's
own documented analysis of the capital needed to
support its subprime lending activities. Examiners
should expect capital levels to be risk sensitive, that
is, allocated capital should reflect the level and
variability of loss estimates within reasonably
conservative parameters. Examiners should also
expect institutions to specify a direct link between
the expected loss rates used to determine the
required ALLL, and the unexpected loss estimates
used to determine capital.42
After this general discussion of the determination of appropriate
capital levels, the 2001 Guidance provides greater specificity:
Given the higher risk inherent in subprime lending
programs, examiners should reasonably expect, as a
starting point, that an institution would hold capital
against such portfolios in an amount that is one and
one half to three times greater than what is
appropriate for non-subprime assets of a similar
type . . . Institutions with subprime programs
affected by this guidance should have capital ratios
that are well above the averages for their traditional
peer groups or other similarly situated institutions
that are not engaged in subprime lending.43
In addition to a requirement of a high ALLL level to deal with
expected losses, the 2001 Guidance requires that regulatory capital
41. Id. at 73,299-34.
42. Id. at 73,299-35.
43. Id.
2002]
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
levels be sufficient to protect the institution from additional and
unexpected losses arising from the enhanced risks associated with
subprime lending. Increased ALLL will adversely affect the
earnings of banking organizations in the short-run, although it may
prevent earnings "surprises" in the long-run.4 As more fully
discussed below, increased regulatory capital allocation increases
the cost of making subprime loans and reduces the economic (as
distinct from GAAP) profits generated by such loans.
The 2001 Guidance expressly exempts from its coverage a
number of types of loans from the subprime category, including:
prime loans that develop credit problems after
acquisition; loans initially extended in subprime
programs that are later upgraded, as a result of their
performance, to programs targeted to prime
borrowers; and community development loans as
defined in the CRA regulations that may have some
higher risk characteristics, but are otherwise
mitigated by guarantees from government
programs, private credit enhancements, or other
appropriate risk mitigation techniques.45
The CRA exception is of particular interest, given the pubic policy
favoring increased credit availability to underserved markets. The
term "community development loan" as defined in the CRA
regulations46 does not include individual home mortgage, small
business, small farm or consumer loans otherwise reported in the
banking organization's assessment area. Accordingly, the
44. Cf Jonathan C. Windham, Note, The Search for Clarity in the Accounting for
Loan-Loss Reserves: Earnings Management vs. Safety and Soundness, 5 N.C.
BANKING INST. 319 (2001) (discussing allegations by the Securities and Exchange
Commission that banking organizations with high-quality assets were "managing
earnings" by excessive provisions for loan and lease losses, to be "drawn down" when
needed to meet earnings estimates); Salil T. Mehta, "Provide This! An expense that
brings a whole new meaning to the term 'accounting fiction,"' Bankstocks.com (Dec.
6, 2001) (proposing the abolition of ALLL), at
http://www.bankstocks.com/ResearchArticle.asp?Article=476 (last visited Feb. 5,
2002).
45. 2001 Guidance, 6 Fed. Banking L. Rep (CCH) T 63-792, at 73,299-33
(emphasis added); see also Community Reinvestment Act and Interstate Deposit
Production Regulations, 12 C.F.R. § 25.11 (2001).
46. 12 C.F.R. § 25.12(i) (2001).
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exception noted above applies to other lending activities, such as
loans to community development corporations or multi-family
housing projects, rather than loans to individuals. The passage
quoted above appears to assume that such loans are subprime
unless supported by additional credit support. It is silent on the
other CRA related loans mentioned above. Such loans are often
subprime and the targeting of such subprime borrowers would be a
"program" under the 2001 Guidance. While the 2001 Guidance is
not pellucid on this point, it appears to require the holding of
additional capital with respect to such loans. Given the cost
implications of such a requirement, the 2001 Guidance may have
the unintended consequence of inhibiting the amount of CRA
related lending by banking organizations.
The requirement of enhanced regulatory capital with
regard to subprime lending has an understandable policy rationale
in terms of the safety and soundness of banking organizations that
engage in such activity, particularly the moral hazard related to the
funding of high-risk activities with insured deposits. Such a
requirement also imposes an additional cost on subprime lending,
relative to other potential uses of a banking organization's balance
sheet. Assuming that other lending or investing activities require
the banking organization to hold regulatory capital of eight
percent of the risk-adjusted value of the assets generated by such
activities, each additional dollar of capital allocated to subprime
lending implies that the banking organization cannot support an
additional $12.50 of alternative activities.47 In addition, the
additional capital allocation reduces the economic profit derived
from subprime lending, in some cases, substantially.
Capital is a valuable commodity and the providers of
capital to firms of all kinds, including banking organizations,
require a return on that capital that reflects its value and the risk
they take in providing it. The following analysis is based on the
assumption, supported by significant research and analysis, that
the true economic profit generated by a firm is its net operating
profit after taxes (NOPAT) in excess of the cost of capital to the
47. One dollar is eight percent of $12.50, since 1 + W10I = 12.5. Accordingly, if
each additional dollar of lending "costs" eight cents of risk-based capital, $12.50 of
additional lending costs $1. If the banking organization in question is vell
capitalized, an additional dollar of risk-based capital would support $10 of additional
lending. Further, if the assets generated by the foregone actihity were risk-v, eighted
less than 100%, the opportunity cost just discussed would be higher.
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firm.4 8  Firms that generate positive economic profit from an
activity will have an incentive to allocate capital to that activity.
On the other hand, activities that do not result in economic profit
destroy economic value and the managements engaged in such
activities will have to eliminate them or face the consequences,
including a reduced share price and conceivably loss of control of
the firm.
Table 1 presents an analysis of the impact of increased
regulatory capital allocation on the generation of economic profit.
The Table contains a comparison of four $100 million portfolios of
subprime loans originated by a banking organization that allocates
capital in an amount sufficient to maintain "adequately
capitalized" status, as a result of which the risk-based capital cost
of the portfolio is eight percent of the risk-adjusted value of its
assets (of which four percent is to be Tier 1 capital) and the
leverage capital cost is four percent of total assets without risk
adjustment. Because the risk-based capital cost of the portfolios
will always equal or exceed the leverage capital cost, further
discussions of regulatory capital charges will deal with the risk-
based capital cost only. It is assumed that each of the portfolios is
made up of a class of assets that has the same risk weighting. The
cost of funds other than capital is assumed to be five percent, the
overhead cost of the loans is assumed to be fifty percent of gross
margin, income taxes are assessed at the rate of thirty percent, and
the cost of capital is assumed to be thirteen percent.49 Portfolio 1
48. The analysis in this section is based on the Economic Value Added (EVA)
financial management doctrine developed by STERN STEWART & COMPANY. The
definitive work on this approach to financial management is G. Bennett Stewart, THiE
QUEST FOR VALUE: A GUIDE FOR SENIOR MANAGERS (1991). Further information
on Stem, Stewart and EVA may be obtained at http://filebox.vt.edu/users/ovalerol
eva/definition.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2001). Because the author of this article is
much less financially sophisticated than Stern Stewart, the calculations in this section
may vary from comparable calculations with respect to financial institutions by Stern,
Stewart itself; accordingly, the following analysis refers to "economic profit" rather
than "EVA." As a member in good standing of the reserve army of the innumerate,
the author presents the calculations that follow with humility and the admonition that
the calculations in the tables that follow are not presented as virtual reality; rather,
they are intended to show the economic impact that increased regulatory capital
charge may have on an institution's economic profit.
49. The assumptions set forth in this paragraph are arbitrary; however, the author
believes that they are close to reality for a number of institutions if it is assumed that
assets are financed with liabilities of roughly comparable duration and that the




COMPARISON OF FOUR PORTFOLIOS
PORTFOLIO PORTFOLIO PORTFOLIO PORTFOLIO
1 2 3 4
Principal $100,000,000 S100,000,001) $100,000,000 S1OO0U.0, 70
Amount
Coupon 8,000,000 8,000,000 8,000,000 8.000,000
(@8%)
Cost of (4,800,00) (4,600,000) (4,400,001) (4,200,00)
Funds
Origination 1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,U00 1,000,000
Feesb
Gross 4,200,000 4,400,000 4,6i,000 4,8010,000
Margin
Expenses' (2,100,000) (2,200,000) (2,30!001 12,400,000)
Pre-Tax 2,100,000 2,200,000 2,300,000 2,400,000
Profit
Taxes (630,000) (660,000) (69UE100) 720,0001
(@30%)




Capital (520,000) (1,040,0001 (1,560,0001 (2,0S0,000)
Charged
Economic 950,000 500,000 50,000 1400,1100)
Profit
a. Following percentages of Principal amount : 5ic-: 6) Portfolo 1 - 9v--
(ii) Portfolio 2 - 92%; (iii) Portfolio 3 - W' ; and ui% Portfolio 4 - 04r,'
b. One percent (1,%) of principal amount.
c. Fifty percent (50%W) of Gross Margin.
d. Thirteen percent (13%j of the amounts of capital alkeatcd to Portfio. il Pcifolio I - 4r:.
Ci) Portfolio 2 - S%; (iii) Portfolio 3 - 12%; and fiv Porlfoio 4 - IVI*.
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assumes that the loans, although subprime, receives the risk
weighting associated with "prudently underwritten" one-to-four
family home loans (fifty percent)," as a result of which risk-based
capital is four percent of the principal amount of the loans.
Portfolio 2 assumes that the loans are one hundred percent risk
weighted, as a result of which eight percent of the principal
balance is funded by capital and ninety-two percent by borrowed
funds. Portfolios 3 and 4 assume that, as the result of the
application of the capital requirements of the 2001 Guidance, the
originating institution is required to allocate regulatory capital in
excess of the standard requirements: twelve percent in the case of
Portfolio 3 and sixteen percent in the case of Portfolio 4.
Table 1 shows that alteration in allocated regulatory capital
makes a significant difference in the economic profit generated by
the portfolios. In order to reach indifference between the
alternative portfolios, the originating institution would have to
generate additional interest or fees sufficient to cover any
additional expenses of origination and the additional taxes
generated by the additional interest. Under the assumptions on
which Table 1 is based, generating the difference between
Portfolio 1 and Portfolio 2 with the next higher regulatory capital
charge, would require at least $643,000"1 of additional interest and
fees if expenses are held constant, and, if the expense factor of fifty
percent of gross margin were included with respect to such
additional revenue, would require additional interest and fees of at
least $1,286,000.52 On the same bases of computation, generating
the difference between one hundred percent and two hundred
percent (Portfolios 2 and 4) risk weighting, would require not less
than $1,286,000 and up to $2,572,000 of additional interest and
fees. Generating the difference in economic profit between
Portfolios 1 and 4 would require not less than $1,928,000 and up to
$3,857,000 of additional interest and fees. Other things equal, the
additional interest and fees required to cover the cost of the
enhanced capital required by the 2001 Guidance could be as much
as 3.8 percent of the aggregate portfolio balance, representing an
50. See discussion supra note 32.
51. $450K x 1 [1-t], where t is the marginal tax rate of 30%.
52. $450K x 1/ [[I-t] x [1-x]], where t is the marginal tax rate of 30% and x is the
expense factor of 50% of gross margin.
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increase of forty percent in the interest and fees set forth on
Table 1.
The examples contained in Table 1 are abstractions from
reality that are based on keeping other variables constant while
different regulatory capital costs are applied. In the real world of
financial services, other things generally are not equal. This is
particularly so with regard to the willingness and ability of
financial institutions to lend money to low income/low wealth
borrowers. In another context, I have argued that the small size of
loans to this segment of the subprime market, coupled with their
perceived risk, creates significant disincentives to the making of
such loans, requiring substantial additional compensation to the
lender.53 This view of the low income low wealth market is not
universally shared.' Whatever the outcome of the social policy
debate, the analysis set forth in Table 1 makes it clear that the
imposition of additional regulatory capital allocation increases the
cost of holding subprime assets relative to prime assets in a
significant amount. Unless such increased costs can be covered by
increased interest and fees relative to those charged in respect of
prime assets, banking organizations will conduct less subprime
lending activity.
V. SECURITIZATION OF SUBPRIME ASSETS
Securitization transactions involve the pooling and
repackaging by a special purpose entity of assets or other credit
exposures into securities that can be sold to investors. - Banking
organizations have engaged in securitization transactions for a
number of years in order to "diversify funding sources, efficiently
manage liquidity and capital, reduce exposure to credit and
interest rate risk, and generate fee income."5' This involvement
has led to guidance from the Agencies regarding the risks
53. Smith. supra note 19, at 14-18.
54. See, e.g., Stegman. supra note 19.
55. Interagency Guidance on Asset Securitization, 7 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
T 69-627, at 81.332 (Dec. 13, 1999). Michael S. Gambro & Scott Leichtner. Selectcd
Legal Issues Affecting Securitization, 1 N.C. BAMdIN'G INST. 131 (1q97).
56. Guidelines for National Bank Securitization Activitics. 7 Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) T 69-626, at 81,328 (Sept. 25, 1996)) [hereinafter Federal Reserve SR k).121;
see also Gambro & Leichtner, supra note 55, at 131-33.
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associated with securitization activities generally." In addition,
the Agencies have provided specific guidance with regard to the
securitization of subprime assets and recent amendments by the
Agencies to the regulatory capital treatment of securitizations will
have a significant impact on such securitization activity. The
analysis that follows will focus on the Agencies' actions that
address the securitization of subprime assets by banking
organizations.
The 1999 Guidelines are the first of the Agency releases to
discuss in detail the securitization of subprime loans and the risks
related to that activity. The 1999 Guidelines point out that:
the securitization of subprime loans carries inherent
risks, including interim credit risk and liquidity risk,
that are potentially greater than those for
securitizing prime loans. Accounting for the sale of
subprime pools requires assumptions that can be
difficult to quantify, and erroneous assumptions
could lead to the significant overstatement of an
institution's assets. Moreover, the practice of
providing support and substituting performing loans
for nonperforming loans to maintain the desired
level of performance on securitized pools has the
effect of masking credit quality problems.58
The two major features of the Agencies' risk analysis of subprime
securitizations in the 1999 Guidelines are: (i) the overstatement of
a banking organization's income through "gain on sale"
accounting; and (ii) the failure of the banking organization's
financial statements to reflect the credit risk retained by the
banking organization through its credit support of the transaction.
The 1999 OCC Guidance amplifies this analysis by discussing the
valuation issues relating to both retained credit enhancements and
servicing assets related to subprime securitizations.59
57. Risks Involved in Bank Organization Asset Securitization Activities, 7 Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) T 69-624, at 81,322 (July 16, 1989); Asset Securitization
Activities, 7 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 69-625, at 81,326 (May 25, 1990);
Interagency Guidance on Asset Securitization, 7 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 69-
627, at 81,332 (Dec. 13, 1999).
58. 1999 Guidelines, 6 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 63-786, at 73,287-92.
59. 1999 OCC Guidance, 6 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 63-786B, at 73,299-4.
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The 2001 Guidance covers securitized subprime loans as
well as those held in portfolio by including in the "aggregate
exposure" to which it applies, "any retained residual assets relating
to securitized subprime loans.""t(  The 2001 Guidance defines
residual assets as follows:
Residual interests are on-balance sheet assets that
represent interests (including beneficial interests) in
transferred financial assets retained by a seller (or
transferor) after a securitization or other transfer of
financial assets; and are structured to absorb more
than a pro rata share of credit loss related to the
transferred assets through subordination provisions
or other credit enhancement techniquesP
Following the concern expressed in the 1999 Guidelines regarding
the retention of credit risk in securitizations, the definition quoted
above focuses on whether a securitization transaction really
transfers the risk from the originating or selling institution to the
purchaser. In circumstances where the originating or selling
institution retains more than its pro rata share of such risk, this
guidance applies its regulatory capital treatment to the retained
residual interest.
It is common for the sponsors of securitizations to provide
credit support for such transactions. One of the earliest releases
on the topic of securitization pointed out in its description of
securitization transactions that: [v]arious credit enhancements are
typically provided by the originator or third parties to provide
investors in the securities added protection against loss. These
enhancements include recourse offered by originators of the
assets, letters of credit, 'spread accounts' and over-
collateralization. ',62  The regulatory capital treatment of such
60. 2001 Guidance, 6 Fed. Banking L. Rep (CCH) S 63-792, at 73299-30.
61. Id
62. Risks Involved in Banking Organization Asset Securitization Activities. 7 Fed.
Banling L. Rep. (CCH) 69-624, at 81-323. Joint Press Release, Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of Thrift Sup2nision, Agencies
Adopt Recourse, Direct Credit Substitutes and Residual Interests Final Rule (Nov.
29, 2001); Section II of Release Publishing the 2001 Final Rule. ( 6 Fed. Reg., at
59,616 (Nov. 29,2001).
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credit enhancements has occupied the Agencies, with increasing
levels of specificity, for over ten years. 63 From 1994 through 2000,
the Agencies issued four releases with either guidance or proposed
regulations addressing the regulatory capital treatment of credit
enhancements in asset securitizations. 4 This activity culminated in
the issuance on November 26, 2001, of an interagency release
establishing a final rule with respect to the matter (the "2001 Final
Rule"). 65  The 2001 Final Rule revises the regulatory capital
treatment of credit enhancements in a number of significant ways,
including: (i) defining with particularity the various categories of
credit enhancements used in asset securitizations; (ii) altering the
risk-based capital treatment of some of such credit enhancements;
and (iii) allowing the use of independent credit ratings (and some
internally generated credit ratings) to determine the risk weights
of some securitization assets and credit enhancements.66 Each of
these revisions has a substantial effect on the regulatory capital
treatment of securitized subprime assets, primarily consisting of
mortgages.
The 2001 Final Rule divides credit enhancements into three
major categories: recourse obligations, direct credit substitutes and
residual interests.67 Recourse obligations and direct credit
substitutes are credit enhancing interests (either on- or off-balance
sheet) that function essentially as a guarantees and are subject to
regulatory capital allocation that is the lesser of (i) the contractual
liability of the banking organization or (ii) the full capital charge
for all assets supported by the credit enhancements.68 The Final
63. Final Rule: Risk-Based Capital Guidelines; Capital Adequacy Guidelines,
Capital Maintenance; Capital Treatment of Recourse, Direct Credit Substitutes and
Residual Interests in Asset Securitizations, 66 Fed. Reg. 59,614 (Nov. 29, 2001) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 3,208. 225,325, 567) [hereinafter 2001 Final Rule]. This rule
was jointly issued by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
and Office of Thrift Supervision. Id. For a discussion of this regulatory process, see
the introductory statement to the 2001 Final Rule. Id. at 59,615-16.
64. Id. See generally Cynthia C. Mabel, Note, Bank Capital Requirements for
Retained Interests in Securitizations, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 233 (2001) (discussing the
effect of securitization activities on bank capital levels and the regulatory response).
65. 2001 Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 59,614.
66. Id. at 59,619-26.
67. Id. at 59,619 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 3, app. A, § 4 (a)(11)).
68. 2001 Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 59614, 59-621-22; the limitation to the full
capital charge of senior assets is pursuant to the low-level recourse rule described in
the 2001 Final Rule. 66 Fed. Reg. 59,614, 59,617 (n.12).
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Rule changed prior regulatory treatment of these two credit
enhancements by imposing a "low level exposure rule," described
above and by equalizing the risk-based capital treatment of direct
credit substitutes (provided by third parties) with that accorded to
recourse interests provided by the transferor. While these changes
are significant, particularly in removing an opportunity for
arbitrage between the two forms of credit enhancement,' the
more significant change for purposes of this article is with regard
to the third type of credit enhancement: residual interests.
The 2001 Final Rule defines a "residual interest" as:
any on-balance sheet asset that represents an
interest (including a beneficial interest) created by a
transfer that qualifies as a sale (in accordance with
generally accepted accounting principles) of
financial assets, whether through a securitization or
otherwise, and that exposes the bank to credit risk
directly or indirectly associated with the transferred
assets that exceeds a pro rata share of the bank's
claim on the assets, whether through subordination
provisions or other credit-enhancing techniques:
This basic definition of the term is substantially similar to the one
set forth in the 2001 Guidance and is supplemented by a list of
examples of the kind of assets that are covered by the term: credit-
enhancing interest-only strips ("CEIOS positions"), spread
accounts, retained subordinated interests, and other comparable
credit enhancements."' CEIOS positions are separately defined as
residual interests that represent "the contractual right to receive
some or all of the interest due on transferred assets."' 2 The Final
Rule excludes from the definition of "residual interest" positions
69. Prior to the 2001 Final Rule, recourse interests had been subject to dollar-for-
dollar regulatory capital allocation subject to the low.-level recourse rule %%hile direct
credit substitutes had been subject to capital allocation only with respect to their face
amount. See 2001 Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 59,614 (for a discussion of this issue).
70. See also 2001 Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 5914 59,632 (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 3, app. A, § 4 (a)(12)).
71. Id.
72. Id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 3, app. A, § 4 (a)(2 1).
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acquired from third parties; however this exclusion does not apply
to CEIOS positions.73
The risk-based capital treatment of unrated residual
interests and CEIOS positions under the 2001 Final Rule is more
stringent than that accorded to recourse obligations and direct
credit substitutes. Unrated residual interests are subject to dollar-
for-dollar risk-based capital allocation without limitation up to the
full amount of the associated contractual obligation. " CEIOS
positions are subject to a further concentration limit of twenty-five
percent of Tier 1 capital, amounts in excess of which are subject to
deduction from capital.75 This treatment is also more stringent
than the Agencies' risk-based capital requirements with respect to
residual interests prior to the 2001 Final Rule, which was dollar for
dollar, up to the full capital charge of the assets to which the
residual related.76 The 2001 Final Rule changes the risk-based
capital treatment of residual interests (other than CEIOS
positions) that are rated by nationally recognized rating agencies
by providing that such interests are subject to reduced capital cost
if they are rated no lower than one grade below investment grade
(BA or BB). If they are granted that rating (BA), the capital
charge would be 200% of the standard capital charge, rather than
dollar-for-dollar.77
Table 2 illustrates the effect of the Final Rule with regard
to residual interests in securitizations by comparing the regulatory
capital treatment of a $100 million portfolio of subprime loans
with the capital cost of a securitization of such loans. The example
is presented on the basis of the same assumptions used in Table 1
and assumes that the securitization requires retention of a ten
percent residual interest that is not a CEIOS. The impact of
various securitization scenarios is as follows:
73. Id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 3, app. A, § 4 (a)(12), 2(c)(4)).
74. Id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 3, app. A, 4 (0(3)(4)).
75. Id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 3, app. A, § 4 (f)(1)(2)).
76. 2001 Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg., at 59,617.
77. Id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 3, app. A, § 4 (d)). Although not
particularly germane to this article, the number of ratings required depends on
whether the position in question is "traded" or "non-traded" as those terms are
defined in the Final Rule. Id. Recourse obligations and direct credit substitutes may,
in certain circumstances, be rated through various internal rating systems of the




COMPARISON OF SUBPPJME ASSET SECUPTIZATIONS
Assets Amount Risk Weieht Rik-Rq'cd Ieverife
________ CaIPItL Capit.al
Loan Portfolio $100,000,000 100W-- 5330,000 S4,000,000
64_AMM Tier I i
Securitization 1
Cash S90,000,000 -0- -0- S3,600,000
Unrated Position 10,000,000 1001 8,000,000 400,090
Totals $10mloo0)O f $.X00.00 S4.0J.o0
i 4-MM Tier I I
Securitization 2 b
Cash S90,000,000 -0- -0- S3.600,03
Unrated Residual $10,000,000 Dollar-for- S10,000,000 400,000
Position Dollar
Totals $f0X00D S1000000 S4.09I.000
(S5MM Tier 1i
Securitization 3'
AAA / AA $90,000,000 20 $2,250,000 $3,600,000
Position
Rated Residual 5,000,000 200 U00,000 200,000
Position
Unrated Residual 5,000,000 Dollar-for- 5,000,080 200,000
Position Dollar
Totals SLOXLO0__0 I) $,5000) S0 090
I 4 MM Tier 1 _
a. Asset Backed Securities "ABS" or Mortgage Backed Sccurities "MBS" traw:mtaon ith arctdvm.J
residual interest under the regulatory regime prior to tho 2(01 Final Rule err t 2001-Final Rule
vith recourse or direct credit substitute credit enhancecnnt.
b. Post-2001 Final Rule transaction with a S1OMM unratcd reaned re, ideal intere t.
c. Post-2001 Final Rule tmrsaction with a$5MM residual oition. Cazh trc:czd m eld in AAA or
AA rated ABS or MBS rositions.
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• Securitization 1 is based on the treatment of residuals prior
to the 2001 Final Rule and is also a rough approximation of
the regulatory capital treatment that would be accorded to
the credit enhancement if it were a recourse obligation
rather than a residual interest. Under this set of
assumptions, there is no risk-based capital effect of the
transaction; for this purpose, it is as if the securitization had
not occurred. Deployment of the cash proceeds generated
by the transaction in anything other than zero risk-
weighted assets would, of course, increase the institution's
risk-based capital cost of its assets.
" Securitization 2 is governed by the 2001 Final Rule and is
supported by an unrated residual interest equal to ten
percent of the principal balance of the portfolio. Because
of the dollar-for-dollar risk-based capital allocation to the
residual interest, the risk-based capital cost of the assets in
question goes up as the result of the transaction. The
transaction may be entered into for other reasons
(liquidity, risk management), but it will bear a substantial
additional cost as a result of the 2001 Final Rule. As noted
above, each dollar of additional capital required to support
the securitization could be used to support $12.50 of other
lending, $25 million in the current example. Further, at a
capital charge of thirteen percent as contemplated by Table
1, the additional capital cost of the assets in question would
be $260,000 per annum, with a concomitant reduction of
economic profit or increase in economic loss.7 8 Here again,
deployment of the cash proceeds of the transaction into
anything other than zero risk-weighted assets would
increase the aggregate risk-based capital costs of the assets.
• Securitization 3 is also governed by the 2001 Final Rule and
is based on obtaining a rating or ratings on half of the
retained residual interest one grade below investment
grade, as a result of which the rated portion is assessed a
risk-based capital charge of sixteen percent (a 200% risk
78. In the interest of simplifying a somewhat complex topic, this analysis assumes
that there is no deferred tax liability associated with the transaction. Such a liability,
if extant, could be subtracted from the face amount of the residual to determine the
capital charge. 2001 Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 59,614, 59,634 (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt.,3, app. A, § 4 (f)(3)).
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weight) and the unrated portion is assessed a dollar-for-
dollar capital charge. It is further assumed that the
proceeds of the transaction are invested in AAA or AA
asset- or mortgage-backed securities, which have a risk
weighting of twenty percent under the 2001 Final Rule,
which securities are comparable to those that may have
been issued in the transaction. In this case, the transaction
results in an aggregate risk-based capital charge for the
relevant assets that is roughly equal to the charge prior to
the transaction. The transaction will have diversified the
institution's asset mix and liquidity. Further, if the rated
portion of the residual can be increased without reducing
the rating, the risk-based capital savings will also increase
(by $84 per $100 increase in the rated position).
The foregoing analysis does not factor in transaction costs, nor
does it involve the implications of "gain on sale" accounting, of
which wiAll be discussed below.
Table 2 makes clear that residual interests are substantially
more costly under the 2001 Final Rule is than under prior Agency
guidance. This is because the Agencies associate residual interests
in subprime securitizations particularly with losses to banking
organizations and the deposit insurance system. In testimony
before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs regarding the failure of Superior Bank, FSB, Jonathan
Reich, a director of the FDIC, stated:
The primary reason for Superior's failure was the
decision of its board and management to book high
levels of retained interests related to the
securitization of subprime assets. . . .Since 1998
failures of institutions with risk characteristics
similar to those of Superior have cost the FDIC
insurance funds more that $1 billion .... Retained
interests, sometimes referred to as "residuals,"
represent an accounting recognition of immediate
gains on the sale of assets in the course of
securitization activities.... A complex, assumption-
driven valuation process makes the value of the
2002]
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retained interest very volatile and subject to much
interpretation.79
Mr. Reich went on to point out that the approximately 140
banking organizations with significant subprime exposure,
"represent just over one percent of all insured institutions, yet they
account for nearly twenty percent of all problem institutions."8
Clearly, the holding of residual interests in respect of subprime
securitizations has brought with it substantial risk to the
institutions holding them and to the deposit insurance system
generally.
At that same hearing, outgoing OTS Executive Director
Ellen Seidman's testimony included a discussion, of the impact of
"gain on sale" accounting under SFAS 140 on the financial
position and results of operations of banking organizations.81
Table 3 contains an example extracted from Director Seidman's
testimony that compares (i) the cash result of a securitization
transaction of $1000 of loans in which a $50 residual interest is
retained; (ii) the accounting treatment of that transaction under
SFAS 140; and (iii) a reconciliation of the cash and accounting
outcomes. This analysis shows the generation of a $30 book gain
on the sale of the loans, as contrasted to a cash loss of $20 on the
same transaction. The "gain" that is booked under GAAP in the
example just cited is based on a valuation of the residual interest
of $50. Gains of this kind have been common in securitizations and
have resulted in the creation of capital. As noted in the preceding
paragraph, such valuations have been very volatile and have
resulted in significant losses in subsequent periods.83
79. The Failure of Superior Bank, FSB: Before the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. (Sept. 11, 2001) (statement of Jonathan
Reich, Director, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation), at http://www.fdic.
gov/news/news/speeches/chairmanspllsepOl.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2002)
[hereinafter Reich Testimony].
80. Id. at 12.
81. Testimony on The Failure of Superior Banks, Federal Savings Bank: Before
the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. (Sept.
11, 2001) (statement of Ellen Seidman, Director, Office of Thrift Supervision),
available at http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/87089.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2002)
[hereinafter Seidman Testimony].
82. Seidman Testimony, supra, note 81.
83. See also Berenson, supra note 1 for a discussion of the impact of gain-on-sale




EXAMPLE OF "GAIN ON SALE" ACCOUNTING
Cash consequence of
securitization
Cash Proceeds $ 930
Cost of loans 1_00)tl1O
Cash gain (loss on sale of
loans) S201i
"Gain on Sale" under
SFAS 140
Cash proceeds $_9_0
Cost of loans _1_000
Retained residual interest (50)
Net cost $_950 _950_
Gain on sale $__ _
Reconciliation
Cash gain (loss) on sale of
loans S 120)
Retained residual interest 50
Gain-on-sale S30
Source: Ellen Seidman, Testimony on tha Failure of Superior Bank, Federal Sa% in2, Bar k t fore th
Committee on Banldng, Housing and Urban Affairs. United State, Senate. Sep.1 I. 201)I. p. 42.
The treatment of residual interests under the 2001 Final
Rule reflects the experience of banking institutions noted above
and the Agencies' valid concerns regarding the valuation of such
interests and the regulatory capital treatment of subprime
securitizations in a manner that reflects economic reality. As the
release promulgating the 2001 Final Rule points out:
large residual positions often signal the lower credit
quality of the sold assets. Further, a banking
organization's use of gain-on-sale accounting affords
it the opportunity to create capital, the amount of
which is related to a residual interest that may not
be worth its reported carrying value. Thus, to
mitigate the effects of these gains, the final rule
requires banks to hold dollar-for-dollar capital
against the related assets. '
84. 2001 Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 59,614, at 59,620.
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Concern about the generation through overly optimistic valuation
of residuals is also the basis for the concentration limit with respect
to CEIOS interests, which are often related to the gains on sale
discussed above.85
In addition to the direct costs it imposes on subprime
lending and securitization, the 2001 Final Rule makes prime
lending and securitization more attractive in terms of capital cost.86
In the first place, because the securitization of prime quality loans
requires less in the way of credit enhancement than do subprime
securitizations, prime securitizations have a lower capital cost.
87
Secondly, the use of credit ratings from nationally recognized
agencies that is authorized by the 2001 Final Rule allows banking
organizations generally, but those with prime assets in particular,
to securitize such assets and either (i) reinvest the proceeds in
asset- or mortgage-backed securities with comparable duration
and yield or (ii) sell only the amount of securities generated by the
securitization necessary to obtain sale treatment, 88 and retain the
rest. Alternatively, prime lenders can enter synthetic
securitizations, where the assets stay on the balance sheet but a
portion of the credit risk is transferred through credit default
swaps. In either case, prime lenders can reduce their regulatory
capital cost while retaining the same or comparable earning assets
on their balance sheets.89 As the examples in Table 2 illustrate,
such a result is much less likely in the case of subprime assets.
85. Id. at 59,619-21(discussing the concentration limit).
86. See generally id. at 59645-59651.
87. Id.
88. Id.; see also Marty Rosenblatt & Jim Johnson, Deloitte & Touche,
Securitization Accounting under FASB 140: The Standard Formerly Known as FASB
125 (2001), available at http://www.deloitte.comldtlcdaldoc/content/fas%20140.pdf
(last visited Feb. 25, 2002); see also The Financial Accounting Standards Board web
site at http://www.fasb.org. For access to FASB and related accounting documents
visit the FASB site.
89. Risk-Based Capital Interpretations Credit Derivatives, 7 Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) 69-627, 81,332 (Nov. 15, 1999). In its discussion of regulatory capital,
this release points out the following:
Under the current risk-based capital guidelines, corporate credits
are assigned to the 100 percent risk category and assigned 8
percent capital. In the case of high-quality investment grade
corporate exposures, the 8 percent capital requirement may exceed
the economic capital that a bank sets aside to cover the credit risk
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Table 4 illustrates the potential regulatory capital savings to
prime lenders by comparing the cost of holding a $100 million
portfolio of prime loans with (i) an asset- or mortgage-backed
securitization of such loans and (ii) a synthetic securitization of the
portfolio. It is assumed that the loans are one hundred percent
risk weighted and that the originating institution is seeking to
maintain adequate capitalization under the relevant regulatory
regime. Under the caption "ABS / MBS Securitization" it is
assumed that a three percent three percent residual interest (not a
CEIOS position), which is significantly greater than expected
losses, is held by the originating institution and that the originating
institution either sells and replaces the minimum position
necessary to obtain sale treatment or sells all of the rated positions
in the securitization ($97 million) and replaces them with securities
of compaiable rating, rate and duration. Under the caption
"Synthetic Securitization," it is assumed that: (i) the loans remain
on the originating institution's balance sheet; (ii) the originating
institution retains a one percent (1%) first loss position; and (iii)
the credit risk above one percent is assumed by an OECD'
"overseas economic development" bank through a credit default
swap, $8 million of which is collateralized by US Treasury
securities.
As a result of each of the transactions noted above, the
risk-based capital cost of the portfolio is substantially reduced. In
the case of the ABS/MBS transaction, the risk-based capital
charge is reduced from $8 million to $4.72 million, with leverage
capital remaining constant at $4 million. The $2.28 million
reduction can be applied to other lending (up to $28.5 million) or
to augment the firm's capital or both. Assuming a thirteen percent
cost of capital, the risk-based capital reduction increases economic
profit by $296,000. The synthetic securitization reduces the risk-
based capital requirement below the leverage capital requirement,
of the transaction. Clearly, one of the motivations behind CLO's
[credit linked obligations] and other securitizations is to more
closely align the sponsoring institution's regulatory capital
requirements with the economic capital required by the market.
Id. at 3.
90. ORGANIZATION FOR EcONOMIc CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
(introductory page explaining the purpose and goals of the organization), at
http:i/v.,lw. oecdwash.orgIABOUT/aboutmain.htm (last visited Feb. 28S. 2002).
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SECURITIZATION OF PRIME ASSETS
Assets Amount Risk Risk-Based Leverage
Weight Capital Capital




AAA / AA $90,000,000 20% $1,440,000 $3,600,000
Position
A Position 7,000,000 50% 280,000 280,000
Unrated Residual
Position 3,000,000 Dollar-for- 3,000,000 120,000
Dollar




Senior Position' $91,000,000 20% $1,456,000 $3,640,000
Position
collateralized by
Treasuries 8,000,000 -0- -0- 320,000
Retained Risk 1,000,000 Dollar-for- 1,000,000 40,000
Dollar
Totals $I00.000.000 $2A56.90( Sf000-000
a. Structure described in "Capital Treatment for Synthetic Collateralized Loan Obligations, 6 Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 66,160 at 71,766 (Nov. 15, 1999).
b. Subject to credit default swap with OECD bank.
so that the reduction is $4 million, freeing up capital that could
support up to $50 million or increase economic profit by as much
as $520,000. While the inclusion of transaction costs and the
differences between Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital could reduce these
amounts, the increases are nonetheless significant.
The analysis set forth above is not intended to imply that
the 2001 Final Rule forbids banking organizations to engage in
subprime lending or securitizations, but does strongly suggest that
the cost of such activity has been increased and that its relative
attractiveness has been reduced. In the absence of significantly
greater interest rates and fees with regard to subprime loans, it is
likely that banking organizations will reduce commitments to the
TABLE 4
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subprime market if and to the extent that prime lending and
investing opportunities are available. The availability of such
revenue enhancements is a question of demand and competition in
the marketplace; however, particularly in the case of loans to low
incomeflow wealth borrowers, it is also a function of what the law
allows.
VI. CONSUMER ISSUES: PREDATORY LENDING
As noted above, all subprime lending is not predatory but
much if not all predatory lending is subprime. The Agencies have
included consumer protection among the areas of special concern
that banking organizations must address when engaged in
subprime lending activities. The particular issues addressed by the
Agencies have varied over time and the differences are interesting.
The 1999 Guidelines base their consumer provisions on the
potential compliance issues raised by subprime lending under "fair
lending and consumer protection laws and regulations."'"1 The
1999 Guidelines express particular concern that: "Higher fees and
interest rates combined with compensation incentives can foster
predatory pricing or discriminatory 'steering' of borrowers to
subprime products for reasons other than the borrower's
underlying creditworthiness." 2  The 1999 Guidelines go on to
specify the various fair lending and consumer protection laws and
regulations that the conduct described above could violate,
including the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994
("HOEPA"), the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA"), and
the regulations under each of them. 3
After acknowledging the benefits that subprime lending
can confer on borrowers "with special credit needs," the 2001
Guidance recognizes that "some forms of subprime lending may
be abusive or predatory. 9 4 The 2001 Guidance defines predatory
lending as follows:
Typically, predatory lending involves at least one,
and perhaps all three, of the following elements:
91. 1999 Guidelines, 6 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) S 63-7;A). at 73.2S7-92.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 2001 Guidance, 6 Fed. Banking L. Rep (CCH) SJ 63-792, at 73,249-37.
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• Making unaffordable loans based on the
assets of the borrower rather than the
borrower's ability to repay an obligation;
• Inducing a borrower to refinance a loan
repeatedly in order to charge high points and
fees each time the loan is refinanced ("loan
flipping"); or
" Engaging in fraud or deception to conceal
the true nature of the loan obligation , or
ancillary products, from an unsuspecting or
unsophisticated borrower. 95
Perhaps on the assumption that high interest rates and fees and
steering are covered by HOEPA and ECOA, the definition of
predatory lending just quoted deals mainly with lender conduct
rather than fees and charges.
The definitions of predatory lending quoted above are not
exclusive. A number of state and local laws and regulations have
defined predatory practices in connection with "high cost loans"
and have either forbidden such practices or made them the
predicate to enforcement activity by governmental agencies.96
Further, the Federal Reserve has amended the HOEPA
regulations to reduce the thresholds under which loans subject to
its restrictions are determined.97 To the extent that legal and
regulatory prohibitions apply to such conduct as "flipping" they do
not necessarily affect the regulatory capital cost issues addressed
above. To the extent that they forbid the charging of interest
rates, fees or other charges that contribute to a particular loan's
economic profit, without regard to the lender's conduct, these laws
and regulations reduce the economic profit of the affected loans.
At the margin, such prohibitions will reduce the availability of
credit to subprime borrowers.98 Whether or not such reduction is a
95. Id. at 73,299-38.
96. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT §24-1.1A (1999); Restrictions and Limitations on
High Cost Home Loans, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. Til. 3, § I, pt. 41 (2001);
Disclosure of Consumer Credit Costs and Terms, MASS. REGS. CODE til. 209, § 32.00
(2002).
97. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Truth in Lending, 66
Fed. Reg. 65,604 (Dec. 20, 2001) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226).
98. For example, the recent attempts of the District of Columbia Council to
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good thing depends on the nature of the borrower and the point of
view of the person making such determination.
VII. CONCLUSION
Subprime lending can accomplish a social good by
providing credit to borrowers in need of a second chance because
of damaged credit and to borrowers, primarily low income low
wealth borrowers, whose financial status would not otherwise
allow them to obtain credit through traditional channels. Other
things being equal, public policy should encourage such activity.
Other things, of course, are not equal. Subprime lending involves
risks to the lender that are greater than those related to prime
lending and that have not been adequately reflected in generally
accepted accounting principles or applicable regulations. Further,
the disparity in bargaining power and information between
subprime lenders and borrowers has resulted in substantially
higher interest rates, fees and charges to the borrowers, some of
which have been characterized as predatory. Public policy has
stepped into the subprime market to protect the deposit insurance
fund from moral hazard and borrowers from predatory conduct.
The result has been an increase in the cost of subprime lending
and a reduction in revenue potential. Regulation with a divided
mind has, in all probability, resulted in less subprime lending at the
margin, desirable and undesirable. Further, the increased cost and
risk of subprime lending has probably resulted in a concentration
of such activity in large institutions that can afford the
administrative overhead necessary to manage the risks of such
activity and that have sufficient capital to withstand the financial
risks it entails.
Is the state of affairs just described socially optimal? Have
public policy and the market properly balanced the interests of
adopt a predatory lending ordinance. A previously adopted ordinance vas
suspended when, among other things, most if not all major home lenders stopped
certain consumer lending activities in the District. The DC Council continues vith its
efforts to adopt a predatory lending bill and lenders continue to threaten a
vdthdrawal from consumer lending. Sandra Fleishman, Another Look at Predatony
Loans, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 2002, at E-1; see also Predatory Laws Thrown Ot;
Brokers in Georgia and DC are Happy to See Them Go, 3 BROKER, No. 6, Dec. 2001 1
Jan. 2002, at 28; Brian Collins, Anti-Predatory Efforts Halted at Local Lerel, 26
NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWS, No. 9, Nov. 12,2001, at 1.
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lenders, borrowers and the deposit insurance system? In the
opinion of the writer of this article, the answers to these questions
are yes and no.
The answers are yes in that the Agencies' actions discussed
in this article allow the interaction of market participants-
lenders, borrowers, securities purchasers, credit providers, rating
agencies-to allocate capital in and to the subprime market based
on the same bargaining process that characterizes other segments
of the capital markets. The Agencies have required that lenders
manage risks professionally and account for their transactions
correctly, but have otherwise left lenders relatively free to manage
this business line and to take the consequences. Banking
organizations that charge fully, within the constraints of the
consumer protection laws mentioned above, and avail themselves
of the means provided for in the 2001 Final Rule to reduce
regulatory capital costs (e.g., ratings) will be able to conduct the
business safely and profitably. At the margin, this will probably
mean that subprime borrowers who are not low income low wealth
borrowers will have to pay increased interest rates to reflect the
increased risk and cost that they represent to the financial system.
However, such borrowers probably will not be denied credit and
will be on a somewhat more even footing with lenders.
The answer may well be no with respect to low-
income/low-wealth borrowers. As mentioned above, the relatively
small size and enhanced risk of transactions with such borrowers
requires significant additional incentives to draw private capital to
this desirable public purpose.99 In the case of such borrowers, the
limitations on rates, fees and charges of applicable consumer
protection laws and regulations may result in a reduction in credit
availability. This result is less a consequence of market failure
than of such borrowers' lack of income, wealth, and knowledge.
With regard to this segment of the subprime market, the
involvement of public and non-profit entities is necessary to
educate and protect such borrowers. Such involvement can ensure
that the credit extended to such persons will be to borrowers who
are educated regarding its cost." Further, where possible, public
99. Smith, supra note 19.
100. See, e.g., Chairman Alan Greenspan, Remarks at the Ninth Annual Economic
Development Summit, The Greenlining Institute, (Jan. 10, 2002), at http:/www.
federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2002/20020110/default.htm (last visited Feb.
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and non-profit entities can assist in bridging the gap between what
low income/low wealth borrowers desire and what the market will
provide through financial support of borrowing by such persons.
To the extent that the credit of such borrowers is enhanced by
government or non-profit entities, as suggested by the 2001
Guidance,'' the capital cost of lending to them vill be borne by
contributors to the non-profits or taxpayers, in the case of
government, rather than the stakeholders in banking organizations
(e.g., shareholders, depositors and the deposit insurance funds).
The Center for Community Self-Help's Secondary Market
Program is an example of a cooperative effort involving banking
organizations, quasi-public agencies and a non-profit organization
that has significantly encouraged home lending to low and
moderate income borrowers."
2
In order to accomplish its social good most effectively,
subprime lending should be done in a way that allows the capital
markets to do what they do best: allocate credit to its most
profitable uses. To the extent that social goods other than
economic profit are designed, the market should be augmented by
government and non-profit entities, for whom such social goods
are the primary mission. In this way regulation with a divided
mind may be succeeded by a policy that is both just and efficient.
19, 2002).
101. See discussion supra at note 45.
102. See SELF-HELP CREDIr, SECONDARY MARKET PROGtR.AM, available at
http:/lvw.self-help.org/secondarymarketlindex.asp (last visited Feb. 15.2002). "The
nonprofit Center for Community Self-Help and its financing affiliates, Self-Help
Credit Union and Self-Help Ventures Fund, comprise one of the nation's leading
communit , development financial institutions (CDFI)." Id. Headquartered in
Durham, North Carolina, Self-Help also has regional offices in Asheville. Charlotte,
Durham, Greensboro, Greenville, and Wilmington. Id.
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